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Toward a Liberal Application of the "Close of All the 
Evidence" Requirement of Rule SO(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure: Embracing Fairness Over Formalism 
Rollin A. Ransom 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 allows a trial 
judge to grant judgment as a matter of law2 against a party, during or 
after a trial, on any claim lacking a legally sufficient evidentiary basis.3 
The first sentence of rule SO(b) states: 
Whenever a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of 
all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is 
deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later deter-
mination of the legal questions raised by the motion.4 
Section (b) therefore requires that in order to move for judgment as a 
matter of law after a jury verdict has been returned, the movant must 
I. Rule 50, as amended in 1991, reads in relevant part: 
(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and 
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that 
party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law against that party on any claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third party claim that 
cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue. 
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submis· 
sion of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law 
and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment. 
(b) Renewal of Motion for Judgment After Trial; Alternative Motion for New Trial. 
Whenever a motion for a judgment as a matter oflaw made at the close of all the evidence is 
denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Such a 
motion may be renewed by service and filing not later than 10 days after entry of judgment. 
A motion for a new trial under rule 59 may be joined with a renewal of the motion for 
judgment as a matter-of law, or a new trial may be requested in the alternative. If a verdict 
was returned, the court may, in disposing of the renewed motion, allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judg· 
ment as a matter of law. If no verdict was returned, the court may, in disposing of the 
renewed motion, direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law or may order a new trial. 
FED. R. Clv. P. 50. 
2. Rule 50 was amended in 1991. Among the amendments was the elimination of the famil· 
iar terms "directed verdict" and ·~udgment notwithstanding the verdict" from the text, in favor 
of ·~udgment as a matter oflaw." The reasons given for the change include: (I) to eliminate the 
anachronisms associated with the older terms; (2) to draw the connection between rule 50 and 
rule 56, where the new language appears; and (3) to demonstrate the common identity of the pre· 
and postverdict motions for judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. C1v. P. 50 advisory commit· 
tee's note (1991 amendments). This Note will use ·~udgment as a matter of law" in its discus-
sion; however, due to the recency of the amendment, most of the cases discussed refer to the 
older terms. Although the terms have changed, the standard for granting a motion under rule 50 
has remained the same. Id.; see also infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
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first have moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue in ques-
tion at the close of all the evidence. 5 Despite this explicit language, 
when the purposes underlying the "close of all the evidence" require-
ment have been served, 6 a majority of the circuits have not strictly 
enforced its terms, thereby creating a "flourishing body of case law on 
the subject of when a motion for judgment [as a matter oflaw] may be 
entertained despite failure to move for a directed verdict at the close of 
the case. " 7 Even those circuits that take a liberal approach to rule 50 
use a variety of standards in determining whether excusal is 
appropriate. 8 
To understand' better the controversial application of rule 50(b) at 
issue here, consider the case of DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Air-
lines. 9 In DeMarines, the plaintiff board~d an airplane traveling from 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). The langilage of the rule is arguably somewhat ambiguous, in that 
the rule itself does not actually state that a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of 
all the evidence must precede a postverdict motion. Rather, it merely provides that such a mo-
tion is subject to renewal following a verdict. Thus, it does not specifically prohibit the granting 
of postverdict judgment as a matter of law where a party has not so moved at the close of all the 
evidence; it merely does not provide for such a situation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). But see 
infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
This Note does not focus on the requirement that a party state the specific grounds on which 
it seeks judgment as a matter of law or on the rule that a postverdict motion for judgment as a 
matter of law is limited to the specific issues raised in the corresponding preverdict motion. At 
one time there was a great deal of debate as to whether "inartful" requests for preverdict judg-
ment as a matter of law satisfied this requirement. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Mcinnes, 723 F.2d 
414, 416-18 (5th Cir. 1984) (defendant's objection to proposed instructions approximated motion 
for'judgment as a matter of law); Ebker v. Tan Jay Intl., Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 822-23 (2d Cir. 
1984) (motion to dismiss functioned as motion for judgment as a matter oflaw), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 161 (1991); Jefferson Realty, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 410 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 
1969) (motion to strike not equivalent to motion for judgment as a matter of law); Gilmore v. 
Lake Shore Motor Freight Co., 331 F. Supp. 1171, 1171 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (request for binding 
jury instructions not treated as motion for judgment as a matter oflaw). This debate has seem-
ingly been foreclosed by the language of rule 50(a)(2), as amended in 1991, and the correspond-
ing advisory committee note: 
The second sentence of paragraph (a)(2) does impose a requirement that the moving party 
articulate the basis on which a judgment as a matter of law might be rendered. The articula-
tion is necessary to achieve the purpose of the requirement that the motion be made before 
the case is submitted to the jury, so that the responding party may seek to correct any 
overlooked deficiencies in the proof. The revision thus alters the result in cases in which 
courts have used various techniques to avoid the requirement that a motion for a directed 
verdict be made as a predicate to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
FED. R. Crv. P. 50(a)(2) advisory committee's note (1991 amendments) (citations omitted). This 
amendment does not affect the requirement at issue here. See infra notes 174-80 and accompa-
nying text. 
6. See, e.g., Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1983) ("We excuse defend-
ants' technical noncompliance with Rule 50(b) under the congruence of circumstances extant in 
this case because we are convinced that the purposes of the rule have been served."); Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 1976) (stat-
ing that the application of rule 50(b) "should be examined in the light of the accomplishment of 
[its] particular purpose as well as in the general context of securing a fair trial for all concerned in 
the quest for the truth"). 
7. Ebker, 739 F.2d at 823. For a discussion of Ebker, see infra notes 97-104 and accompany-
ing text. 
8. See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text. 
9. 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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Zurich to Amsterdam, and ultimately to the United States. During 
the flight to Amsterdam, he experienced discomfort in his head, appar-
ently due to changes in cabin pressure, causing numbness, garbled 
speech, and a persistent loss of equilibrium. DeMarines filed suit 
against the airline under the Warsaw Convention.Io To prevail under 
the Convention, a plaintiff must present evidence that he or she suf-
fered bodily injury on board an aircraft as the result of an "acci-
dent, "11 defined by relevant case law as "an unusual or unexpected 
happening."I2 
In his case-in-chief, DeMarines introduced evidence that six of the 
191 passengers on board had experienced aural discomfort, and that 
an unidentified flight attendant informed another passenger that there 
was a problem with the air pressure. This constituted his only evi-
dence on the question of whether an accident had occurred. I3 The 
airline moved for a directed verdict at the close of DeMarines' case-in-
chief, arguing that the passenger had not demonstrated the existence 
of "unusual or unexpected events" sufficient to constitute an acci-
dent. I4 The trial judge denied KLM's motion. Although this motion 
arguably put DeMarines on notice that the airline contended that he 
had not introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate the occurrence 
of an accident, he presented no additional evidence. Is 
In its case-in-chief, the airline introduced the testimony of six crew 
members, all of whom refuted the plaintiff's claim of insufficient cabin 
pressurization. I6 The defense then introduced evidence on unrelated 
issues and rested, but failed to move again for a directed verdict.17 
After the jury returned a verdict for DeMarines, the airline moved for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied the mo-
tion and KLM appealed, again arguing that DeMarines did not prove 
10. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation 
by Air, Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000. 
11. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation 
by Air, Oct. 29, 1934, ch. III, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3000, 3018. 
12. DeMarines, 580 F.2d at 1196-97 (citations omitted}. 
13. 580 F.2d at 1197. 
14. 580 F.2d at 1195 & n.4. 
15. The purpose of rule 50 is to provide the nonmovant an opportunity to cure any defect 
which the movant sees in the nonmovant's case, see infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text, 
but the judge's denial of the motion is not necessarily indicative of the judge's feelings about the 
merit of the motion. See, e.g., 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2533 (1969) ("[I]t has been said to be 'the better and safer practice ••• 
to defer a ruling upon the motion for a directed verdict until both sides have finally rested.' " 
(quoting Guess v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 191 F.2d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1951))). 
16. 580 F.2d at 1197. 
17. In DeMarines, KLM actually handed a written motion to the trial judge's law clerk, but 
the clerk apparently failed to pass the motion on to the judge. As a result, the Third Circuit on 
appeal treated KLM as if it had simply failed to renew its motion, since it had not followed the 
proper procedure for filing papers with the court under FED. R. C1v. P. 5(e). 580 F.2d at 1195 
n.4. 
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the existence of an accident. is 
In its opinion, the Third Circuit noted the paucity of evidence on 
the "accident" question and strongly suggested that DeMarines had 
failed to establish an element necessary to recover under the Warsaw 
Convention. 19 Despite this fact, the court refused to reverse the dis-
trict court's denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in accord-
ance with the Third Circuit's strict approach to rule 50(b).20 The 
airline's failure to renew its motion for a directed verdict at the close 
of all the evidence precluded it from obtaining judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, or appealing its denial. Although the court 
found that the airline likely deserved judgment as a matter of law, the 
airline's procedural error limited its remedy to a costly and time-con-
suming new tria1.21 
DeMarines well illustrates the importance of rule 50 interpretation. 
Under a strict reading of rule 50, a party that fails to move for judg-
ment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence may not chal-
lenge the verdict or appeal the judgment based on insufficient 
evidence. Some circuits, including the Third Circuit, have taken this 
approach.22 Others, however, have adopted a more liberal view of rule 
50, and excuse noncompliance with the "close of all the evidence re-
quirement" under certain circumstances.23 In those circuits, the air-
line's initial motion in DeMarines, which arguably served to inform 
DeMarines of the deficiencies in his case, might have adequately pre-
served the airline's right to obtain a postverdict judgment as a matter 
of law, or to challenge its denial on appeal. 
This Note examines the language and purposes of rule 50 to deter-
mine if and when a relaxed application of its requirements is appropri-
ate. Part I considers the terms and goal of the rule and concludes that 
its purpose is to put the party opposing the motion for judgment as a 
matter of law on notice of the movant's assertion that the evidence is 
insufficient as a matter of law, and to provide the opposing party an 
opportunity to "cure." Part II discusses courts' varying application of 
the requirement that a motion for judgment as a matter oflaw made at 
the close of all the evidence precede a renewal of such a motion after 
18. 580 F.2d at 1195. 
19. For example, the court noted, "We do have a serious question •.. whether the plaintiff 
produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that an 'accident' did in 
fact occur." 580 F.2d at 1197. It later added, "[W]e have grave doubts that a finding that an 
accident occurred in this case is legally supportable." 580 F.2d at 1198. 
20. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. 
21. Under FED. R. Crv. P. 59, a motion for judgment as a matter of law at trial is not a 
predicate for a post-verdict motion for a new trial. Therefore, even those circuits employing a 
strict approach to rule 50(b) may grant a new trial in the absence of a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law at the close of all the evidence. See infra note 154. 
22. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text. 
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the jury has returned its verdict. Part III analyzes the approaches and 
argues that, given the purpose behind rule 50(b) and the spirit of the 
Federal Rules, a liberal interpretation of this requirement is appropri-
ate. This last Part proposes an amendment to the rule which alters its 
language to reflect better the purposes the rule is intended to serve. 
I. THE LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF RULE 50(B) 
The advisory committee's note to the 1963 amendments to rule 50 
makes clear that "[a] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
will not lie unless it was preceded by a motion for a directed verdict 
made at the close of all the evidence."24 Many courts, however, have 
looked to the rule's purposes to determine when its terms should be 
enforced strictly.25 This Part therefore considers the reasons behind 
the rule's enactment. 
A. The Seventh Amendment 
An original purpose of the "close of all the evidence" requirement 
was to comply with the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee.26 
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) advisory committee's note (1963 amendments). Although the Inn· 
guage of the rule has changed, its substance, and particularly the "close of all the evidence" 
requirement, has not. See Windsor Shirt Co. v. New Jersey Natl. Bank, 793 F. Supp. 589, 594 
n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("On December 31, 1991, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) was amended •••• [T]he 
amendment did not change the substance of the rule."). In fact, the new language makes the 
"close of all the evidence" requirement clearer than the pre-1991 language. Prior to the most 
recent amendments, rule 50(b) read: 
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or 
for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury 
subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Not later than 
10 days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to 
have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered 
in accordance with the party's motion for a directed verdict. 
The second sentence of the prior section states that the right to move for judgment notwithstand· 
ing the verdict is preserved by "a party who has moved for a directed verdict," but makes no 
mention that the directed verdict motion must have been made at the close of all the evidence. 
The advisory committee note was thus necessary to confirm that the directed verdict motion in 
the second sentence referred back to that in the first sentence, which included the requirement 
that it be made at "the close of all the evidence." See Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 273 (7th 
Cir.) ("Rule 50(b) is not a model of perspicuity • . . • Thus, one learns from the notes of the 
Advisory Committee on the 1963 amendments to the rule that '(a] motion for judgment notwith· 
standing the verdict will not lie unless it was preceded by a motion for a directed verdict made at 
the close of all the evidence.'"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 848 (1986); McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 
750 F.2d 1383, 1390 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Rule 50(b) is not clearly drafted (one might have thought 
that after 46 years something would have been done about this).''). The commentators and case 
law, however, generally accepted, without exception, the requirement that a motion for a di· 
rected verdict be made at the close of all the evidence in order to preserve the right to challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence later. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 2537 and cases 
cited therein; SA JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 50.08 (2d ed. 1992) 
and cases cited therein. The revised rule 50(b) arguably eliminates the confusion engendered by 
its predecessor, but the advisory committee note remains. 
25. See infra notes 62-124 and accompanying text. 
26. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise 
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Although the directed verdict motion existed when the Seventh 
Amendment was ratified, judgment notwithstanding the verdict did 
not.27 As a result, the Supreme Court in 1913 held that the Seventh 
Amendment prohibited a court from entering judgment in favor of one 
party when a jury had returned a verdict for the other.28 Twenty-two 
years later, however, in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 29 
the Supreme Court undermined this absolutist interpretation. There, 
the Court stated that when the trial judge had expressly reserved rul-
ing on a motion for a directed verdict at trial, the judge could then 
legitimately grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because the 
latter action was technically a grant of the constitutionally acceptable 
directed verdict which the judge had reserved. 30 The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, originally promulgated two years after Redman in 
1937, eliminated the need for an express reservation. Then, as now, 
rule 50(b) provided that a court is "deemed" to have reserved the de- -
termination of legal issues whenever a motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law made at the close of all the evidence "is denied or for any 
reason is not granted."31 
Although the Third Circuit continues to rely upon the constitu-
tional rationale in strictly enforcing the "close of all the evidence" re-
quirement of rule SO(b),32 the continuing viability of this particular 
constitutional concern is questionable. This Note argues that when a 
court applies the proper standard for the granting of a postverdict mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law, it does not deny a litigant's Sev-
enth Amendment rights, even when the court does not strictly enforce 
the "close of all the evidence" requirement, because the court does not 
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law. 
U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. 
27. See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 381-82 (1913). But see Leo Carlin, 
Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 14, 19, 22 (1948) (noting that in fact a similar 
practice did exist under English common law, and that the ignorance of the Slocum court of the 
practice created a great furor in the legal community). The actual jury control devices that 
existed at the time of ratification of the Constitution varied significantly from their modem coun-
terparts. For a discussion of the early devices utilized, see Edward H. Cooper, Directions for 
Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv. 903, 909-16 (1971). 
28. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 364. Slocum was a five-to-four decision. The dissent argued that 
means similar to those employed by the parties to the action existed to some extent at common 
law, and that the majority, "in now condemning this practice, long followed in the courts below, 
..• is departing from, instead of applying, the principles of the common law, and is extending 
rather than enforcing the constitutional provision." 228 U.S. at 428. 
29. 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
30. 295 U.S. at 658-59. 
31. FED. R. C1v. P. 50(b); see also Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh 
Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289, 337 n.211 (1966) ("Rule 50(b), passed in [1937], converted 
the reservation into a fiction by 'deeming' it to have been made whenever a directed verdict 
motion was denied."). 
32. See, e.g., Mallick v. International Bhd. of Blee. Workers, 644 F.2d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 
1981) ("We, however, do not deem a rule whose underpinnings rest in the United States Consti-
tution to be a mere technicality that should be readily dispensed with."). 
1066 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1060 
reexamine the facts found by the jury. Rather, the court merely con-
siders whether a sufficient legal basis exists for a party's verdict.33 The 
advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules, as well as most courts 
and commentators, support this view. 
1. The Advisory Committee View 
The constitutional basis for the "close of all the evidence" require-
ment has long been considered suspect. In 1946, the advisory commit-
tee noted that the automatic reservation provision of rule 50(b) was 
likely unnecessary: 
The provision in the original rule that the court "is deemed to have sub-
mitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal 
questions raised by the motion" to direct, resulted from an over-meticu-
lous effort to stay within the limits of Baltimore & Carolina Line Inc. v. 
Redman and Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co. It is an awkward fiction. 
The Advisory Committee thinks it should be eliminated and that it is not 
a denial of the constitutional right to jury trial to grant a judgment, 
notwithstanding a verdict, whether or not the trial court reserved or may 
be "deemed" to have reserved the question of law raised by a motion to 
direct.34 
The advisory committee's note to the 1991 amendments similarly 
downplays this "constitutional" basis of rule 50(b). The 1991 note 
states, "At one time, this [fictional reservation] requirement was held 
to be of constitutional stature, being compelled by the Seventh 
Amendment."35 In the note accompanying section (b) of the rule, the 
advisory committee states, "One purpose of this concept was to avoid 
any question arising under the Seventh Amendment. It remains useful 
as a means of defining the appropriate issue posed by the post-verdict 
motion."36 In addition, the advisory committee's report, which ac-
companied the proposed amendments sent to Congress, noted that 
some had argued to eliminate the requirement that a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law at trial generally precede a post-trial motion. 
In explaining its reasoning for maintaining the requirement, the com-
mittee completely ignored the constitutional rationale.37 The note to 
the recent amendments to rule 50 further illustrate the anachronistic 
nature of the constitutional justification for the requirement: 
The expressed standard makes clear that action taken under the rule is a 
33. See MOORE, supra note 24, 11 50.09. 
34. FED. R. C1v. P. 50(b) advisory committee's note (unadopted 1946 amendments) quoted 
in MOORE, supra note 24, 11 50.01[4] (citations omitted). Although the proposed amendments 
were not adopted, the advisory committee's note indicates a skepticism toward the constitutional 
argument. 
35. FED. R. C1v. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991 amendments) (emphasis added). 
36. Id. (emphasis added). 
37. H.R. Doc. No. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1991). The advisory committee's report 
(which is distinct from the advisory committee's note) focused solely upon the cure rationale 
discussed infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text. 
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performance of the court's duty to assure enforcement of the controlling 
law and is not an intrusion on any responsibility for factual detennina-
tions conferred on the jury by the Seventh Amendment or any other 
provision of federal law. 38 
In other words, the drafters of the amended rule 50 meant that when a 
court merely considers whether a sufficient legal basis exists for a 
party's claim, but does not reexamine the facts found by the jury, there 
is no violation of the Seventh Amendment. 39 
2. The Federal Courts 
As noted above, only a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
made at the close of all the evidence will fall within the constitutional 
guidelines set by Redman, as adopted by rule 50(b ). A party that fails 
to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence 
therefore falls outside the scope of rule 50(b ), because the party has 
presented no motion upon which the court's decision can be "deemed" 
reserved. Even if the party moved earlier for judgment as a matter of 
law and the court reserved its decision at that time, the party does not 
technically fall within the Redman standard of constitutionality be-
cause a motion for judgment as a matter of law expires upon the intro-
duction of new evidence. 40 
Despite this fact, most lower federal courts have allowed a party to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury returns the verdict 
or on appeal, even if the party did not satisfy the "close of all the 
evidence" requirement at trial.41 In doing so, they generally do not 
even acknowledge that such actions are outside the scope of the 
Supreme Court's articulated constitutional limits. Indeed, to the ex-
tent that any of these courts recognize any constitutional concern 
whatsoever, it is generally in passing. For example, in McKinnon v. 
City of Berwyn, 42 the Seventh Circuit acknowledged with skepticism 
the traditional constitutional argument43 and noted, "[W]hether or 
not there was a reason [to require parties to move for judgment as a 
matter of law during trial in 1791], there is a pretty good reason to-
day." The court then went on to discuss the curative purpose of the 
rule.44 Only the Third Circuit continues to cite the Seventh Amend-
38. FED. R. C1v. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991 amendments). 
39. See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 62-69 and accompany-
ing text. 
40. See Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U.S. 17, 23 (1893); MOORE, supra note 24, ~ 50.05[1] & nn.4-5 
(discussing relevant cases); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 2534 & n.2 (discussing relevant 
cases). 
41. See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text. 
42. 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984); see infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text. 
43. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
44. McKinnon, 750 F.2d at 1388; see also Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven 
Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 1976) ("There is a better reason for establishing 
the motion for directed verdict as a condition precedent to a motion for judgment n:o.v. [than 
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ment as a reason for strictly enforcing the rule. 45 
Even the Supreme Court has retreated somewhat from the strict 
historical and constitutional considerations which gave rise to the 
"close of all the evidence" requirement. As early as 1940, the 
Supreme Court upheld without comment the constitutionality of the 
fictional reservation provided in rule 50(b).46 The Court thereby im-
plicitly recognized that a judge need not actually reserve a question of 
law in order to reverse a jury's verdict. In accepting this "fictional 
reservation," the Supreme Court departed from the historical basis un-
derlying the decisions in Slocum and Redman, 41 which required an 
actual reservation in order to preserve the right to renew a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law after the jury returned its verdict. 48 
Scholars commenting on the cases likewise dismiss the importance of 
the constitutional considerations.49 For these reasons, the Seventh 
Amendment concern underlying the "close of all the evidence" re-
quirement of rule 50(b) has been all but abandoned. 
B. The "Cure" Rationale 
The second and more significant purpose for the rule 50 "close of 
all the evidence" requirement is to "assure the responding party an 
opportunity to cure any deficiency in that party's proof that may have 
been overlooked until called to the party's attention by a late motion 
for judgment."50 A party must therefore make a motion for judgment 
as a matter of law prior to the submission of the case to the jury to 
"avoid making a trap" by offering such a motion for the first time 
following the return of the verdict.5 I Indeed, when rule 50 was 
amended in 1991, the cure rationale actually preserved the general re-
quirement that a party first move for judgment at trial as a predicate 
for a postverdict motion for judgment. In its report, the advisory com-
that raised by Seventh Amendment concerns]." (quoting SA JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 50.08 (1975))). 
45. See infra notes 62-69. Although the Eleventh Circuit, like the Third Circuit, construes 
rule SO(b)'s requirements strictly, the Eleventh Circuit does not base its decision upon the Sev· 
enth Amendment. See infra not~ 70-76. 
46. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940). 
47. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
48. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
49. Foremost among these is Professor Moore: "[S]ince motions under rule 50 present only 
questions of law, a court's reconsideration of its decision on the sufficiency of the evidence, after 
the jury has returned a verdict, is not a denial of the right to jury trial, nor a reexamination of 
any fact tried by the jury." MOORE, supra note 24, ff 50.09. Professors Wright and Miller also 
acknowledge that there is no Seventh Amendment violation when the court "withdraws from the 
jury a case in which there is no issue of fact requiring the jury's determination." WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 15, § 2522 (quoting Manaia v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 268 F.2d 793, 799 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959)); see also Carlin, supra note 27, at 22°25. 
50. FED. R. C1v. P. SO(a) advisory committee's note. 
51. See MOORE, supra note 24, ff 50.08 and cases cited therein. 
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mittee noted that "some persons have argued for [the] deletion [of this 
requirement]."52 The committee concluded, however, that the protec-
tion against unfair surprise to the opposing party justified its 
retention. 53 
The advisory committee's note to the 1991 amendments also 
placed great importance on the cure rationale. In the note to para-
graph (a)(l) of rule 50, the committee stated, "In no event ... should 
the court enter judgment against a party who has not been apprised of 
the materiality of the dispositive fact and been afforded an opportunity 
to present any available evidence bearing on that fact."54 The advi-
sory committee reiterated the importance of providing the opposing 
party an opportunity to remedy its case in the note accompanying par-
agraph (a)(2).55 
To understand the importance of the "cure" rationale in practice, 
recall DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. 56 The initial motion 
provided DeMarines with notice that KLM challenged the sufficiency 
of his evidence. Alerted to this potential deficiency, DeMarines could 
have attempted to "cure" by any of a number of approaches. He 
might have tried to elicit favorable cross-examination testimony from 
one of KLM's witnesses that would have established the occurrence of 
an "accident."57 . Or he perhaps could have submitted additional evi-
dence on the accident issue, either on surrebuttal or by reopening his 
case-in-chief. 58 When put on notice of a deficiency in its proof, there-
52. H.R. Doc. No. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1991). 
53. Id. ("The Civil Rules Committee determined that there was sufficient reason to retain 
that requirement •.. ; the requirement does protect against possible surprise."). 
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1991 amendments). 
55. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) advisory committee's note (1991 amendments) ("The pur-
pose of [requiring a motion prior to the close of the trial] is to assure the responding party an 
opportunity to cure any deficiency in that party's proof that may have been overlooked until 
called to the party's attention by a late motion for judgment."); see also infra notes 135-42 and 
accompanying text. 
56. 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978); see supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text. 
57. As noted supra note 16 and accompanying text, this approach was unsuccessful in 
DeMarines. The defendant's witnesses all refuted the plaintiff's claim that there was a problem 
with cabin pressurization. 580 F.2d at 1197. Courts, however, regularly recognize the possibility 
that a defendant will in fact provide the missing element of a plaintiffs case. See, e.g., Della 
Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F.2d 343, 350 (1st Cir. 1986) (Following an unsuccessful directed 
verdict motion, the defendants presented their case, after which all parties rested; the court 
noted, in refusing to excuse defendants' failure to renew motion, that "it can hardly be disputed 
that plaintiff's case •.. was far stronger at the close of all evidence than it was at the time the 
original motion for directed verdict was made."); Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1012 
(7th Cir. 1973) ("It not infrequently happens that the defendant himself, by his own evidence, 
supplies the missing link.") (quoting Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U.S. 17, 23 (1893)), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 932 (1974). 
58. On surrebuttal, the party with the burden of proof has the opportunity to address issues 
which were raised by an opponent on rebuttal. The permitted scope of surrebuttal, however, is 
narrow. "[It is] not an opportunity to present again those weak aspects of your case in chief but 
rather, it is an opportunity narrowly limited to addressing issues that were raised on rebuttaI and 
which reasonably could not have been anticipated and presented during plaintiff's case in chief." 
T.H. OEHMKE, THE CIVIL LmGATION MANUAL 10-3 (1980). A court may, in its d.iscretion, 
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fore, a party does have available avenues by which to cure.59 
When a party first moves for judgment as a matter of law after the 
jury has returned its verdict, however, it is too late for the opposing 
party to remedy the faults in his or her case and the movant may 
achieve a "tactical victor[y] at the expense of substantive interests. " 60 
Even those courts that excuse noncompliance with the technical man-
dates of rule 50 therefore require that, at a minimum, the curative 
purpose of the rule be satisfied. 61 
II. THE DIVISION IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS ON THE "CLOSE 
OF ALL THE EVIDENCE" REQUIREMENT 
Litigants who have moved for judgment as a matter of law before 
allow a party to reopen its case-in-chief where the party has "omitted evidence of a legally essen-
tial element by accident, inadvertence, or even because of a mistake." Id. Still, courts generally 
dislike reopening a case once the party has rested and it is therefore not best to rely upon a court 
to do so. Id. ("Most judges feel that there should be some conclusion to the presentation of 
evidence and, consequently, they are reluctant to reopen a case once a party has rested."). 
Although it is theoretically possible that this process could repeat ad infinitum, as a realistic 
matter this does not occur, because of the narrow scope of surrebuttal evidence and the disincli-
nation of judges to allow parties to submit additional evidence. Id. 
59. For example, in DeMarines, the court noted that the plaintiff's failure to provide compe· 
tent medical or expert testimony connecting the plaintiff's injury to an unusual change in cabin 
pressure significantly contributed to its "grave doubts" about the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
submitted on the accident issue. See 580 F.2d at 1197-98. For another example of curing by 
providing additional evidence, see McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984): 
If the defendants' counsel had moved for a directed verdict on behalf of the City of Berwyn, 
explaining that no evidence had been presented that the city's policy-making organs had 
been involved in the illegalities of the defendant [police] officers, [the plaintiff's] counsel 
might have taken steps to repair this omission, for example by renewing his offer .•• to 
introduce evidence of a previous lawsuit against one of the defendant officers, evidence that 
might help show that there had been a pattern, perhaps amounting to a policy or custom, of 
similar violations of Fourth Amendment rights by the Berwyn police force. 
McKinnon, 750 F.2d at 1389. 
60. MOORE, supra note 24, ~ 50.08. 
61. See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text. Another basic purpose of rule 50 as a 
whole is to promote efficiency by allowing a court to enter judgment as a matter of law at trial, if 
appropriate, and thus not waste judicial resources and jury time on useless jury deliberations. 
See FED. R. C1v. P. SO(a)(l) advisory committee's note (1991 amendment). Excusing parties 
from satisfying the close of all the evidence requirement does not, however, affect this efficiency 
concern for two reasons. First, judges are strongly encouraged to allow a case to go to the jury, 
ratherthan risk the strict appellate review ofa preverdictjudgment as a matter of law. See FED. 
R. Crv. P. 50(b) advisory committee's note (1991 amendments) (noting the concerns about strict 
review and concluding, "For these reasons, the court may often wisely decline to rule on a mo-
tion for judgment as a matter oflaw made at the close of the evidence ••• • ");see also WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 15, § 2533; Note, Rule 50(b): Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, SS 
COLUM. L. REV. 517, 519 (1958). 
Second, judges who wish to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law before sending a 
case to the jury, but have no motion before the court, may order such judgments sua sponte. See 
Spence v. Board of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1204 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) 
(quoting Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 488 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D. Nev. 
1980)). Furthermore, when a trial court is hesitant to grant a preverdict motion for judgment as 
a matter of law sua sponte, the court may suggest to the defendant that the defendant move for 
such a judgment. See Panotex Pipe Line Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 457 F.2d 1279, 1281 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). 
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the "close of all the evidence" and then attempted to challenge on 
appeal the sufficiency of evidence have had mixed success in federal 
appellate courts. This Part details the courts' reactions. Section II.A 
discusses those courts that demand strict compliance with the terms of 
rule 50(b) and refuse to consider on appeal the sufficiency of the evi-
dence unless the movant satisfied the proper procedural predicate. 
Section II.B discusses the approaches of courts that take a relaxed 
view of the requirement. Such cases arise when a party moves for 
judgment as a matter of law before the close of all the evidence, but 
the court excuses the party's failure to renew the motion at the close of 
all the evidence because the purposes of rule 50 nonetheless are met. 
The case law, which is not always consistent even within a given cir-
cuit, reveals the various approaches. 
A. A Strict Application: The Third and Eleventh Circuits 
Two circuits have adopted a strict approach to the requirements of 
rule 50. In Lowenstein v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pennsauken, 62 suc-
cessors in interest to Booth Bottling Company, Inc. brought an anti-
trust action, alleging that Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of 
Pennsauken had violated the Sherman Act. 63 Pepsi moved for a di-
rected verdict at the close of Lowenstein's case-in-chief. The judge 
denied the motion, and Pepsi presented its case. It then failed to re-
new its motion at the close of all the evidence, and the case went to the 
·jury. The jury returned a verdict for Lowenstein, prompting Pepsi to 
move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the district 
judge granted. 64 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the judgment, holding that 
Pepsi's failure to renew the motion for a directed verdict at the close of 
all the evidence, as required by rule 50(b ), precluded it from obtaining 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 65 Although Pepsi argued that 
the initial directed verdict motion provided Lowenstein with the op-
portunity to cure and thus satisfied the purposes of the "close of all the 
evidence" requirement, the court disagreed. It focused on both the 
cure and the constitutional concerns traditionally offered to justify the 
rule, 66 and noted that such concerns required careful consideration of 
the reasons for taking an issue from the jury. The court concluded 
that, particularly in a complex and lengthy trial, such "careful scru-
tiny" should occur after the presentation of all the evidence. 67 The 
court added: 
62. 536 F.2d 9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966 (1976). 
63. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1988). 
64. Lowenstein, 536 F.2d at 10. 
65. 536 F.2d at 11-12. 
66. 536 F.2d at 11-12. 
67. 536 F.2d at 12 n.6. 
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The provisions of the rule are clear. The lock has a large visible keyhole 
and the key to turn the lock is as plainly described as we believe to be 
possible. The rule has been in effect for a very considerable length of 
time. We do not see any reason to obfuscate a plain rule by adding a 
gloss to it to aid those who, for reasons unknown to us, have not seen fit 
to follow it. 68 
The Third Circuit has consistently applied this interpretation to the 
requirements of rule 50(b ). 69 
The Eleventh Circuit espouses a similarly strict approach to rule 
50. In Mark Seitman & Associates, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 70 Seitman and R.J. Reynolds had entered into a contract, 
whereby Seitman would publish a weekly sports tabloid during the 
football and basketball seasons with R.J. Reynolds as the sponsor and 
sole advertiser. Halfway through the contract term, the sponsor ter-
minated the contract. Seitman brought an action for breach of con-
tract. At trial, R.J. Reynolds moved for a directed verdict at the close 
of Seitman's case, which the court denied. Reynolds then failed to 
renew the motion at the close of all the evidence and allowed the case 
to proceed to the jury, which returned a verdict for Seitman. Despite 
the procedural omission, the district court allowed Reynolds to move 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which it denied on the mer-
its. 71 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit simply stated that, because of 
the inadequacy of Reynolds' procedural predicate, neither the district 
court nor the circuit court had the authority to consider whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 72 
The Eleventh Circuit recently reconsidered the issue in Redd v. 
68. 536 F.2d at 12. The court undercut its own "plain meaning" approach, however, in 
acknowledging that a directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence may be substituted 
by a request for a binding jury instruction, where the trial court treats the request as if it were a 
directed verdict motion, and does so with the knowledge of all of the parties. 536 F.2d at 11 n.5. 
The legitimacy of this position is now questionable, given the 1991 amendments to rule 50. 
Under the new requirements of the rule, a motion for judgment as a matter of law "shall specify 
the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the 
judgment." FED. R. C1v. P. 50(a)(2). The advisory committee note to the 1991 amendments 
states that the requirement "thus alters the result in cases in which courts have used various 
techniques to avoid the requirement that a motion for a directed verdict be made as a predicate to 
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." FED. R. C1v. P. 50 advisory committee's 
note (1991 amendments) (citations omitted). Thus, a request for a binding instruction will no 
longer suffice to meet the requirements of rule 50(a)(2). See a/so supra note 5; infra notes 174-76 
and accompanying text. This amendment to the rule, however, does not affect the "close of all 
the evidence" requirement. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. 
69. 536 F.2d at 11-12. The Third Circuit affirmed the "firmly entrenched" rule espoused in 
Lowenstein in Mallick v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 644 F.2d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 1981). 
In response to the defendant's argument that the court was "exalting an overly rigid and techni-
cal application of Rule 50(b) over interest in judicial efficiency," the Mallick court emphasized 
the constitutional basis for the requirements, arguing that ''.judicial efficiency may be better 
served when jury verdicts receive the respect to which they are entitled under the Seventh 
Amendment." 644 F.2d at 234. 
70. 837 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1988). 
71. Seitman, 837 F.2d at 1530. 
72. 837 F.2d at 1531. The court listed the rule as its authority, and did not consider any 
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City of Phenix City. 73 Redd, a black police lieutenant, sued the city for 
discrimination in not promoting him to police chief, and in discharg-
ing him. As in Seitman, the Redd trial court denied the city's motion 
for a directed verdict at the close of Redd's case. The city failed to 
renew the motion at the close of all the evidence, and the jury returned 
a verdict for Redd. 74 The trial judge apparently ignored Seitman and 
held that the requirements of rule 50(b) were "purely technical," ex-
cused the city's failure to renew the motion at the close of all the evi-
dence because a proper motion had been made earlier.in the trial, and 
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the city.75 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, stating: "We are presented with a par-
ticularly clear and mechanical rule of law; the [city] did not comply 
and the district judge may not waive his magic wand dismissing a pro-
cedural requirement as a technicality."76 The Eleventh Circuit reads 
the language of the rule strictly and focuses on absolute compliance 
with its technical requirements, rather than on the substantive injus-
tices such an approach might engender. 
B. A Liberal Application: Five Variations 
1. The Plurality Test 
The First Circuit considered the "close of all the evidence" re-
quirement of rule 50(b) in Bayamon Thom McAn, Inc. v. Miranda. 77 
In Bayamon, the plaintiffs were a fifteen month-old minor who had 
fallen from a hobbyhorse and her parents. They sued K.iddielane Flor-
ida Corp., which owned the horse, Bayamon Thom McAn, the owner 
of the store where the accident occurred, and Melville Shoe Corp., 
which had leased the hobbyhorse to Bayamon. The plaintiffs claimed 
that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide warning signs 
and safety features on or around the horse and in distracting the 
mother while she was supervising her infant daughter. 
The defendants moved for a directed verdict at the end of the 
plaintiffs' case. When asked if he had granted the motion, the judge 
responded, "No. However, I have not denied it. I am following the 
usual federal practice of reserving ruling on it; if the verdict is against 
you, you can still argue it anyway."78 The defendants then presented 
their case-in-chief, which lasted a few minutes and "held no sur-
exceptions. The circuit had previously refused to adopt liberal standards. See Coker v. Amoco 
Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1983). 
73. 934 F.2d 1211 (11th Cir. 1991). 
74. Redd, 934 F.2d at 1214. 
75. 934 F.2d at 1214. 
76. 934 F.2d at 1214. 
77. 409 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1969). 
78. Bayamon, 409 F.2d at 970. The appellate court noted that the trial judge's reservation 
was technically in error. 409 F.2d at 971; see supra text accompanying note 40. 
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prises."79 They failed to renew their motion for a directed verdict. 
Counsel made their closing arguments, and the jury was excused to 
deliberate. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the judge invited 
the defendants to make their motions for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, which he subsequently denied. 80 
. The defendants appealed the denial of judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. The First Circuit initially considered whether the right to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal had been preserved 
at trial. The court noted that the trial court, through its statements 
following the initial motion for a directed verdict, "preliminarily indi-
cated its disposition to let the case go to the jury and instructed coun-
sel to plan accordingly."81 The court then concluded that defendants' 
counsel may have therefore been led to believe that they had ade-
quately preserved their right to move for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. 82 
The First Circuit went on to state that the evidence submitted fol-
lowing the directed verdict motion was extremely limited and did not 
bear on the issue of the defendants' negligence, which was the focus of 
the directed verdict motion. 83 Thus, a renewed motion for a directed 
verdict at the close of all the evidence would have been futile because 
the evidence introduced following the initial motion could not have 
changed the trial court's mind about submitting the case to thejury.84 
Based upon these facts, the court held: "[l]n a case combining the 
kind of judicial assurance concerning preservation of rights at the time 
of motion and the brief and inconsequential evidence following the 
motion, we deem that this is a proper case for the liberal construction 
commended by [rule] 1 in the interest of justice."85 The First Circuit 
79. 409 F.2d at 972. The defendants' evidence consisted of the submission of eight exhibits 
into evidence, all of which had been identified in the pretrial order, and none of which went to 
the issue of negligence. In addition, counsel for two of the defendants read to the jury a portion 
of the mother's deposition testimony, including a statement she made to her husband that she 
"let the girl fall." The counsel for the other defendant unsuccessfully attempted to admit other 
portions of the deposition, and had the marshal operate the hobbyhorse in the courtroom. 409 
F.2d at 971. This portion of the trial lasted "no more than a few minutes" and "occup[ied] only 
two pages of transcript." 409 F.2d at 972. 
80. 409 F.2d at 971. At the time the defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, the trial judge noted in passing the defendants' failure to move for a directed verdict at 
the close of all the evidence, and that the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
might therefore be improper. He nonetheless ruled on the motions on the merits. 409 F.2d at 
971. 
81. 409 F.2d at 971. 
82. 409 F.2d at 971. 
83. 409 F.2d at 971-72. 
84. 409 F.2d at 972. 
85. 409 F.2d at 972. The court also noted, however, the generally "stringent" nature of the 
requirement that a party _move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, and warned 
that "procedural wrangles would multiply if the requirement could be deemed nonessential upon 
a mere showing of a court's continuing disinclination to grant [a motion for directed verdict 
made prior to the close of all the evidence]." 409 F.2d at 971. Subsequent First Circuit decisions 
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thus concluded that the trial court properly considered the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 86 
Under the First Circuit test, a party moving for judgment as a mat-
ter of law before the close of all the evidence nonetheless satisfies the 
requirements of rule 50(b) when (1) the judge gives some assurance 
that failure to renew the motion will not result in a waiver of the mo-
vant's right to argue for judgment as a matter of law following the 
jury's verdict; and (2) the evidence introduced following the initial mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law is extremely limited in both 
amount and value. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have also 
adopted this "two-prong" test, 87 making it the plurality standard. 
2. The Fifth Circuit Variation 
The Fifth Circuit has also declined to apply the technical require-
ments of rule SO(b) strictly but has taken a slightly different approach 
than that embodied by the two-prong plurality test. In Miller v. 
Rowan Companies, Inc., 88 Miller, a fishing tool supervisor, brought a 
claim against his employer under the Jones Act. 89 At trial, Rowan 
moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Miller's case-in-chief, 
asserting that he had not established that he was a seaman for the 
purposes of the Jones Act. The court took the motion under submis-
sion, apparently without further comment, and ordered that the trial 
continue. The employer presented no evidence, and an additional de-
fendant presented only three witnesses, none of whom testified as to 
Miller's status as a seaman. At the close of all the evidence, the em-
ployer failed to renew its motion. The jury returned a verdict for 
have emphasized the rarity with which the "Bayamon exception" should be applied. See, e.g., 
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 810 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988) 
("Under very rare circumstances, [a directed verdict] motion need not be repeated at the close of 
all evidence if such a repetition is clearly superfluous or futile."); Javelin Inv. v. Municipality of 
Ponce, 645 F.2d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[W]e do not find this to be ... that type of 'exceptional' 
case where noncompliance with Rule SO(b) should be overlooked."). 
86. 409 F.2d at 972. The court then affirmed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
against Bayamon Thom McAn, but reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict against 
Kiddielane and Melville. 409 F.2d at 973. 
87. See, e.g., Boynton v. TRW, Inc., 858 F.2d 1178, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting and adopt-
ing plurality formulation); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 294 (8th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983). The Halsell court identified the general rule requiring that a 
party first move for judgment as a matter of Jaw at the close of all the evidence but acknowledged 
the "liberal view" of the rule and concluded that 
[a]Jthough the movant fails to renew its motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, a court may nevertheless grant judgement n.o.v. if the evidence introduced 
after the motion for directed verdict was brief, and the court somehow indicated that re-
newal of the motion would not be necessary to preserve the right to move for judgment 
n.o.v. 
683 F.2d at 294; see also Armstrong v. Federal Natl. Mortgage Assn., 796 F.2d 366, 370 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (quoting and adopting test from Halsell). 
88. 815 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1987). 
89. 46 u.s.c. § 13 (1940). 
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Miller, and, upon the employer's motion, the judge entered judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the employer.9o 
On appeal, Miller argued that the trial court erred in entering 
judgment for the employer, because the employer had not renewed its 
motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. The 
court noted that it had adopted a liberal approach to the requirements 
of rule 50,91 and articulated its test: "[W]hen the trial court reserves 
its ruling on the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the only 
evidence introduced after the motion is not related to the motion, the 
defendant's failure to renew his motion should not preclude a judg-
ment n.o.v. in his favor."92 The court concluded that the employer 
had therefore preserved the right to move for a postverdict judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Although Miller cites Bayamon among the cases supporting its 
test, Miller differs from the plurality test. The cases Miller relies upon 
do not suggest that a mere reservation of an earlier motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law will preserve the right to challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence after the verdict is returned. Rather, those 
cases suggest that the judge must affirmatively indicate that the mo-
vant preserves the right to move for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 93 Miller seems to depart from this affirmative act require-
ment. Moreover, when such an indication is present, the cases on 
which Miller relies allow a party to move for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict when a judge has denied or reserved - and not only 
reserved- a previous directed verdict motion.94 Finally, the plurality 
test considers both the amount and relevance of the evidence intro-
duced after the initial motion, while the test stated in Miller is con-
cerned solely with the relevance of such evidence.95 
90. Miller, 815 F.2d at 1023-24. 
91. See, e.g., Merwine v. Board of Trustees for State lnsts. of Higher Learning, 754 F.2d 631, 
634-35 (5th Cir. 1985); Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715 F.2d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1983). 
92. 815 F.2d at 1025. 
93. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Federal Natl. Mortgage Assn., 796 F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(acknowledging that defendant's motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintitrs case "may 
just well be a good motion," but denying the motion "without prejudice to reverse myself," so 
that the court had an opportunity to study the parties' briefs); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 
683 F.2d 285, 294 (8th Cir. 1982) (when defendant attempted to renew earlier motion for di-
rected verdict at instruction conference, which occurred in the afternoon on the last day of trial 
but before the close of all the evidence, judge told him that proper time to renew would be at the 
close of all of the evidence, but that at the same time the court considered the motion renewed), 
cert denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983); Bayamon Thom McAn v. Miranda, 409 F.2d 968, 970 (!st 
Cir. 1969) (reserving defendants' motion for directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiffs' 
case, but stating, "[I]f the verdict is against you, you can still argue it anyway."). 
94. See, e.g., Armstrong. 196 F.2d at 370 (denying defendant's motion at the close of the 
plaintitrs case). 
95. Compare Miller, 815 F.2d at 1025 (stating that lenience is appropriate when "the only 
evidence introduced after the motion is not related to the motion") with Bayamon, 409 F.2d at 
972 (requiring that the evidence following the initial motion be both "brief and inconsequential") 
(emphasis added). 
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The Fifth Circuit test, as expressed in Miller, is thus both broader 
and narrower than that in the cases upon which it relies. It is broader 
because it requires merely a reservation of the initial motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law by the trial judge, and not some judicial assur-
ance of preservation of rights. 96 It is also broader because it allows 
lenience when the initial motion is followed by a significant amount of 
evidence, as long as that evidence is unrelated to the motion. The test, 
however, is narrower because it is lenient only when a judge has re-
served decision on a directed verdict motion, and not when the judge 
has denied the motion but indicates that the movant has preserved the 
right to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
3. The Second Circuit Variation 
The Second Circuit adopted a modified version of the plurality test 
in Ebker v. Tan Jay International, Ltd. 91 Ebker was a designer of wo-
men's clothing who had entered into a joint venture with Tan Jay, to 
produce two lines of clothing. Ebker claimed that Tan Jay wrongfully 
repudiated the agreement. At trial, Tan Jay moved for a directed ver-
dict following the presentation of Ebker's case-in-chief. The court re-
served its decision on the motion, stating, "I will let [Ebker's counsel] 
argue to the jury."98 Tan Jay introduced substantial evidence that 
weakened Ebker's case and then allowed the case to go to the jury 
without renewing its motion for a directed verdict .. Following a jury 
verdict for Ebker, Tan Jay moved for and received a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.99 
On appeal, Ebker argued that the trial court improperly granted 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Tan Jay failed to follow 
the procedural dictates of rule 50(b ). Faced with this issue for the first 
time, the Second Circuit considered the plurality formulation but ulti-
mately opted for a modified version. 100 The court retained the first 
branch of the plurality test and reformulated the second.101 
The Ebker court reasoned that it was possible for a defendant, fol-
lowing an unsuccessful directed verdict motion at the close of the 
plaintiff's case, to introduce extensive evidence that would achieve the 
defendant's desired objective: to strengthen the defendant's case with-
out in any way strengthening the plaintiff's. In such a case, the court 
stated, "little justification would seem to exist for finding significance 
96. But see Bohrer. 715 F.2d at 216-17 (emphasizingjudicial assurances in allowing consider-
ation of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict despite defendant's failure 
to move for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence). 
97. 739 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 161 (1991). 
98. Ebker. 139 F.2d at 819. 
99. 739 F.2d at 819-20. 
100. 739 F.2d at 823-24. 
101. 739 F.2d at 823-24. 
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in the quantitative aspect" of the evidence following the failed directed 
verdict motion.102 Ebker thus reformulated the second prong of the 
plurality test, focusing solely upon the effect on the nonmoving party. 
A court could consider the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, despite the lack of a proper procedural foundation, under the 
following circumstances: (1) the court indicated that the movant's 
rights were preserved; and (2) the evidence introduced after the unsuc-
cessful directed verdict motion was of such a nature that the opposing 
party could not "reasonably have thought that the moving party's ini-
tial view of the insufficiency of the evidence had been overcome and 
there was no need to produce anything more in order to avoid the risk 
of judgment n.o.v."103 For example, under the facts of Ebker, because 
the defendant's case "in no way added to [the plaintiff's] case ... [but 
instead] seriously detracted from it," the court held that the second 
prong had been met. 104 The Second Circuit's approach is therefore 
broader than the plurality approach, because it focuses on the sub-
stance of the evidence introduced following the initial motion, rather 
than merely the quantity of such evidence. 
4. The Ninth Circuit and the Farley Exception 
The Ninth Circuit takes a unique approach to rule 50. It applies 
the mechanical test of the Third and Eleventh Circuits in those cases 
where the trial judge denies an initial motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, but adopts a liberal approach when the judge instead reserves 
its decision on such a motion. Farley Transportation Co. v. Santa Fe 
I 
102. 739 F.2d at 824 (quoting Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974)). The court noted that this was true "at least in a case 
where no objection was made to the court's entertaining the post-verdict motion.'' 739 F.2d at 
823-24. The court did not address how the test might be applied in a case where the nonmoving 
party opposed the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the time it was proffered. 
103. 739 F.2d at 824. The actual text of the decision, however, contains an unfortunate 
error. The court's opinion as written allows for the postverdict motion where "the opposing 
party ..• could reasonably have thought that the moving party's initial view of the insufficiency 
of the evidence had been overcome,'' omitting the word "not" between "could" and "reason-
ably". 739 F.2d at 824. Subsequent decisions, however, have made it clear that the second 
prong, to make sense, must necessarily include the word "not." See, e.g., Best Brands Beverage, 
Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F.2d 578, 587 n.3 (2d Cir. 1987) ("That an omission has 
occurred is evident from the overall argument in which this passage is included and from the 
opinion's quotation, immediately following this passage, of a passage from Moran v. Raymond 
Corp . .•. which supports the argument only if the Ebker passage is read with the word "not" 
inserted."). 
104. 739 F.2d at 824. The court also found that the defendant had met the first prong. 
When Tan Jay moved for a directed verdict at the close of Ebker's case, the trial court said, "I 
will reserve on your motion and I will let [plaintifrs counsel] argue to the jury." The reviewing 
court held that because the defendant could have interpreted this to mean that a subsequent 
directed verdict motion would not be necessary, and possibly not even entertained, the motion 
met the first prong. 739 F.2d at 823. As a result, the Second Circuit found that the trial court 
had properly considered Tan Jay's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court 
ultimately concluded, however, that the trial judge erred in granting Tan Jay's motion. 739 F.2d 
at 827-28. 
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Trail Transportation Co., 105 for example, has a procedural history sim-
ilar to most of the cases in this area. Farley was an antitrust action 
brought by Farley Transportation Company, which claimed that the 
defendant, the Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, conspired 
with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company and various 
shipper's agents and associations to evade the rates of a regional 
branch of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Santa Fe unsuccess-
fully moved for a directed verdict at the close of Farley's case and then 
failed to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence. The court 
suggested that allowing such a defendant to challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
without first moving for a directed verdict could prejudice the oppos-
ing party: 
Failure to renew an earlier motion for a directed verdict may lull the 
opposing party into believing that the moving party has abandoned any 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence once all of the evidence had 
been presented .... A strict application of rule SO(b) obviates the neces-
sity for a court to engage in a difficult and subjective case-by-case deter-
mination of whether a failure to renew a motion for directed verdict at 
the close of all the evidence has resulted in such prejudice to the oppos-
. ing party under the particular circumstances of that case.106 
Thus, the court appeared simply to adopt the mechanical approach 
toward the rule employed by the Third and Eleventh Circuits. 
The Farley court went on, however, to recognize one exception to 
the requirements of rule 50. It held that when the trial court took an 
earlier motion for a directed verdict under advisement, it would excuse 
procedural imperfection.107 Under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the 
simple reservation of a directed verdict motion prior to the close of all 
the evidence accomplished three necessary purposes: it "maintains the 
motion as a continuing objection to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
provides notice to the opposing party of the challenge, and constitutes 
a judicial indication that renewal of the motion is not necessary to 
preserve the moving party's rights."108 The Ninth Circuit thus 
adopted a test similar to the first prong of the Fifth Circuit Miller 
105. 786 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985). 
106. 786 F.2d at 1346. The court specifically rejected the approach of the Seventh Circuit, as 
embodied in McKinnon v. City ofBerwyn, 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984). Farley suggested that 
requiring the trial judge to determine whether the party opposing judgment as a matter of law 
had been prejudiced would "invit[e] confusion," and concluded that 
[i]t is precisely such a difficult examination that a uniform application of Rule 50(b) is 
designed to avoid. We decline to adopt an interpretation of Rule 50(b), even assuming the 
language of the rule would so permit, that requires us to engage in a subjective analysis of 
the strength or weakness of the evidentiary foundation of one party's case, before we even 
determine whether we may review the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 
786 F.2d at 1346 n.2. 
107. 786 F.2d at 1346. 
108. 786 F.2d at 1346-47. 
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test, 109 requiring that the court reserve its ruling on the motion, but 
without the accompanying prong relating to the amount and relevance 
of the evidence submitted following the motion. 
5. The Seventh Circuit's "Prejudice" Test 
The Seventh Circuit has taken an approach that hinges on preju-
dice to the opposing party. McKinnon v. City of Berwyn 110 involved a 
civil rights action against four policemen and the city. At trial, one of 
the defendants moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plain-
tiff's case-in-chief, which the judge denied. The defendant failed to 
renew the motion at the close of all the evidence, and the jury returned 
a verdict for the plaintiff. The judge granted the defendant judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and the plaintiff appealed, citing the pro-
cedural error. 111 
The Seventh Circuit noted that it had adopted a liberal view to-
ward the requirements of rule 50(b):112 when the party opposing a 
procedurally defective motion has not been unfairly prejudiced, the 
rule's requirements need not be strictly enforced.113 The court mea-
sured prejudice against a party with the same test incorporated in the 
second prong of the Second Circuit's Ebker test. 114 The court ex-
plained this prong as follows: 
If none of the evidence put in as part of the defendant's case weakens the 
defendant's motion for directed verdict, the plaintiff cannot argue that he 
thought that the defendant, by not renewing the motion, had abandoned 
it because its evidentiary foundations had been weakened, and thinking 
this had therefore not put in rebuttal evidence that might have repaired 
the evidentiary deficiencies exposed by the initial motion.115 
Unlike the various two-prong tests, however, the Seventh Circuit's ap-
plication of this exception to rule 50(b) does not require any action or 
statement on the part of the judge. As the court in McKinnon 
observed: 
109. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
110. 750 F.2d 1383, 1390 (7th Cir. 1984). 
111. McKinnon, 750 F.2d at 1387-88. 
112. See, e.g., Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 
(1986); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 
532 F.2d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1976). 
113. 750 F.2d at 1388. Although the Seventh Circuit looks to whether the plaintiff was 
"prejudiced,'' it is actually concerned with whether the plaintiff was unfairly prejudiced. That is, 
a plaintiff who has a jury verdict taken away is always prejudiced in some sense. However, where 
the plaintiff has been given the opportunity to cure deficiencies in his proof but the case remains 
legally insufficient, the plaintiff is not unfairly prejudiced when a court enters judgment for the 
defendant. See, e.g., Benson, 786 F.2d at 274 (excusing failure to renew a directed verdict motion 
at the close of all the evidence where the defendant's failure "did not unduly prejudice his oppo-
nent" (emphasis added)). 
114. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text. 
115. 750 F.2d at 1390. 
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Although in most of the cases we have cited the judge had said he would 
reserve action on the motion for directed verdict, there was no reserva-
tion in [earlier Seventh Circuit cases,] and we do not think it should be a 
rigid precondition for leniency, at least in a case such as this where there 
is not even a smidgen of prejudice to the opponent.116 
As a result, the Seventh Circuit merely looks to the potential prejudice 
which a failure to renew might have had on the opposing party. 
Where none exists - that is, where the plaintiff should assume that 
the defendant's motion stands - the failure is excused, and both the 
trial court and the reviewing court may consider the sufficiency of the 
evidence after a verdict is returned.111 
In sum, all of the circuits that employ a liberal approach to the 
"close of all the evidence" requirement of rule SO(b )118 have essentially 
the same goal: to excuse noncompliance in the absence of unfair prej-
udice to the opposing party. Most of these courts have developed 
proxies to determine when, based upon this general principle, excusal 
is appropriate. A plurality of the circuits look to the statements of the 
judge and the quantity and quality of evidence introduced following 
the initial motion in their consideration of this issue.119 The Second 
Circuit also deems judicial indication of preservation of rights impor-
tant, but focuses on the relevance, rather than the quantity, of evi-
dence following the motion.120 The Fifth Circuit looks only at the 
relevance of subsequently introduced evidence, and apparently does 
not consider a judge's statements dispositive; it takes a liberal ap-
proach only when a judge reserves decision on, rather than denies, the 
initial motion.121 The Ninth Circuit is lenient only when the judge 
reserves decision on the initial motion, with no regard to the evidence 
introduced following the motion.122 Finally, the Seventh Circuit takes 
a liberal approach to the rule when the opposing party is not unfairly 
prejudiced. In doing so, it focuses on whether the opposing party 
could reasonably have believed that the movant had abandoned its 
116. 750 F.2d at 1390. With respect to cases in which there was "slight prejudice," the court 
suggested that "a lulling remark by the judge might be necessary to tip the balance in favor of 
leniency," but where the prejudice was more than slight, "the motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict should be dismissed." The court concluded that "it would be excessively strict to 
confine the policy of leniency to cases where the judge happens to have reserved action on the 
motion for directed verdict when it was made (and never renewed)." 750 F.2d at 1390. 
117. See, e.g., Ohio·Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 825-26 (7th Cir. 
1978) ("Any additional proof which [the plaintiff] could properly introduce on rebuttal was in no 
way foreclosed, and no suggestion is made that the motion for judgment n. o. v. hinged in any 
material way on Ohio's lack of rebuttal evidence or Sealy's surrebuttal proof .... [The defendant 
is therefore] entitled to have its attack on the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] evidence heard on the 
merits."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). 
118. See supra notes 77-117 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
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motion.123 Thus, each approach attempts to protect the errant mo-
vant, without prejudicing its opponent, in a significantly different man-
ner. Figure 1 approximates the situations in which each circuit is 
likely to take a liberal approach to the "close of all the evidence" re-
quirement of rule 50(b ).124 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES 
This Part considers the various approaches discussed in Part II 
and concludes that a liberal approach to the "close of all the evidence" 
requirement best serves the purposes of rule 50 and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Section III.A argues that the best approach is that 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit. Section III.B considers the weakness 
of the other circuits' interpretations. This Part concludes in section 
III.C by proposing an amendment to rule 50(b) which better reflects 
the purposes the rule is designed to serve. 
A. The Preferred Approach: The Seventh Circuit Test 
Rule 50(b) requires a party to move for judgment as a matter of 
law at the close of all the evidence in order to preserve the right to 
renew the motion after a jury returns its verdict. 125 However, rule 
50(b) does not exist in a vacuum. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."126 Indeed, 
rule 1 has been called the most important of the Federal Rules. 127 An 
application of one of the rules that results in inefficiency contravenes 
"the liberal spirit imbuing the Federal Rules of Procedure."128 In 
view of the rules' overriding purposes, this section concludes that the 
Seventh Circuit's approach to rule 50(b) best serves both that rule's 
and the Federal Rules' overall spirit. That approach focuses upon 
whether the procedural omission unfairly prejudiced the party oppos-
ing the postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. 129 
As discussed above, the requirements of rule 50 are intended to 
give the opposing party notice that the movant deems the evidence 
presented insufficient as a matter of law, and to provide an opportu-
123. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra notes 62-117 and accompanying text. 
125. See FED. R. C1v. P. SO(b). But see supra note 5 (noting arguable ambiguity). 
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. 
127. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 1029 ("[The rule] reflects the spirit in which 
the rules were conceived and written, and in which they should be ... interpreted. The primary 
purpose of procedural rules is to promote the ends of justice ..•. "). 
128. Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Pittsburg-Des 
Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1976) (The rules "in 
any case should be examined in the light of the accomplishment of their particular purpose as 
well as in the general context of securing a fair trial for all concerned in the quest for the truth."). 
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nity to cure any deficiency exposed by the motion.130 A motion for 
judgment as a matter of law which occurs at the completion of the 
plaintiff's131 case-in-chief, at the earliest, provides such notice. Under 
section (a)(2), the movant is required to "specify the judgment sought 
and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the 
judgment."132 The plaintiff is thus made aware of the defendant's ob-
jection to the sufficiency of the evidence and has the opportunity to 
cure.133 The plaintiff may affirmatively present additional evidence, or 
may allow the defendant to present its case and attempt to fill in the 
gaps in his or her case through cross-examination of the defendant's 
witnesses. 134 
A satisfactory motion for judgment as a matter of law at trial, 
whether it occurs at the close of all the evidence or not, should there-
fore fulfill the curative justification for rule 50. This much has been 
acknowledged, at least impliedly, by the advisory committee to the 
Federal Rules. It discusses the cure rationale for the requirements of 
rule 50 in its notes to paragraphs 50(a)(l)135 and 50(a)(2)136 rather 
than the notes to paragraph 50(b ). 137 This placement is interesting 
because courts typically cite the cure rationale as one purpose of the 
"close of all the evidence" requirement of 50(b ). 138 By including the 
cure rationale in the notes relating to motions that are made at "any 
time before submission of the case to the jury,"139 the advisory com-
130. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text. As noted in Part I, although there was at 
one time a constitutional rationale for the requirements of this rule, this rationale has been all but 
abandoned. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text. 
131. Although the text of rule 50 is facially neutral and either party may move for judgment 
as a matter of law, the defendant is the moving party in the overwhelming majority of cases in 
which the issue has arisen. For simplicity and relevancy's sake, this discussion will assume the 
moving party to be the defendant. See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC 
COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 679: 
In the typical case it is the defendant who moves for Uudgment as a matter oflaw] on the 
ground that the plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proof. At times, however, as when 
the sole issue is one on which the defendant has the burden of proof, the plaintiff will move 
for Uudgment as a matter of law]. 
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2). 
133. See 5A MOORE, supra note 24, 11 50.08 and cases cited therein. 
134. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
135. If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and 
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that 
party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law against that party on any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim that 
cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 50(a)(l); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
136. "Motions for judgment as a matter oflaw may be made at any time before submission of 
the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts 
on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. SO(a)(2); see also supra 
note 55 and accompanying text. 
137. See FED. R. C1v. P. SO(b) advisory committee's note (1991 amendments); infra note 140 
and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text. 
139. FED. R. C1v. P. SO(a)(2). 
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mittee implicitly recognized that even a motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law that occurs prior to the close of all the evidence, and that is 
not renewed at the close of all the evidence, nonetheless can fulfill the 
curative purpose of rule 50. 
Indeed, the. only rationale the most recent advisory committee 
notes give for the "close of all the evidence" requirement is that it is "a 
means of defining the appropriate issue posed by the post-verdict mo-
tion. "140 A party, however, can presumably fulfill this purpose with 
any motion for judgment as a matter oflaw. Paragraph (a)(2) requires 
that such a motion, regardless of when it occurs, must identify the 
contested issue and the specific legal and factual basis for the mo-
tion.141 The necessity of the requirement, at least based upon the most 
recent explanation of the drafters, 142 thus remains somewhat question-
able, because a motion for judgment before the close of all the evidence 
both defines the appropriate issue for consideration, and provides the 
plaintiff with the opportunity to cure its deficient case. 
If the plaintiff's case is no stronger at the close of all the evidence 
than at the time of the original motion, the plaintiff "cannot argue that 
he thought that the defendant, by not renewing the motion, had aban-
doned it because its evidentiary foundations had been weakened."143 
No unfair prejudice to the plaintiff then results if the court examines 
the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence following the return of 
the verdict. The plaintiff has notice that the defendant believes itself 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and has the time and opportu-
nity to cure any defects exposed by the defendant's motion. 
Indeed, the only time a plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced is when 
additional evidence comes forward after the initial motion, either in 
the defendant's case or introduced by the plaintiff, which partially 
strengthens the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff may believe that it has 
responded to the defendant's initial objection to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and therefore does not need to introduce further evidence to 
support its case. The defendant then has the obligation, consistent 
with the purposes of rule 50, to renew its motion for judgment as a 
matter of law at the close of all the evidence. This motion would indi-
cate to the plaintiff that the defendant continues to assert that the 
plaintiff's evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. That is, unfair 
140. FED. R. C1v. P. 50(b) advisory committee's note (1991 amendments). 
141. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
142. It is generally the courts that have extended the cure rationale to explain the "close of 
all the evidence" requirement. See, e.g .. Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 273-74 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986); Lowenstein v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 536 F.2d 9, 12 n.6 (3d Cir.), 
cert denied, 429 U.S. 966 (1976). 
143. McKinnon v. City ofBerwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1390 (7th Cir. 1984). This test necessarily 
vests discretion in the trial judge to determine whether this standard is met. Although the stan-
dard itself appears somewhat vague, it has been applied with apparent success in the Second and 
Seventh Circuits. See supra notes 97-104 and 110-17, respectively, and accompanying text. 
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prejudice occurs when, based upon the evidence adduced following the 
initial motion, the plaintiff "reasonably [believes] that the moving 
party's initial view of the insufficiency of the evidence [has] been over-
come and there [is] no need to produce anything more in order to 
avoid the risk of [postverdict] judgment [as a matter of law]."144 
When, however, neither the defendant's evidence nor any further evi-
dence introduced by the plaintiff adds to or strengthens the plaintifrs 
evidentiary foundation, the plaintiff cannot complain that it was 
prejudiced by the defendant's failure to renew.145 Professor Moore 
has adopted this "prejudice" standard in the most recent version of his 
treatise. 146 
Although this approach to rule 50(b) requires a court to engage in 
the "case-by-case determination" criticized by the Ninth Circuit in 
Farley Transportation Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 147 trial 
judges routinely make such case-specific determinations. As with vir-
tually every motion that comes before a trial court, the judge has par-
ticipated in the entire trial and thus is well situated to decide whether 
a party opposing a postverdict motion has been prejudiced.148 In the 
144. Ebker v. Tan Jay Intl., Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
161 (1991). 
145. The lack of unfair prejudice manifests when the plaintiff fails to produce any additional 
evidence which would refute the issues raised by the defendant's motion. See, e.g., American 
Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1988) ("More importantly, [the plnintitl] 
claimed neither that it would have nor that it could have presented any additional evidence to 
compensate for deficiencies in its proof."). Where a party claims that the movant's failure to 
renew an earlier motion for judgment as a matter of law prejudiced its case, that party's inability 
to demonstrate that it would or could have introduced evidence to combat the movant's objec-
tion to the sufficiency of the evidence strongly indicates a lack of prejudice. 
146. Professor Moore notes: 
[S]ome courts have held that a motion for judgment under Rule SO(b) may be granted, 
despite the movant's failure to renew a previous motion under Rule 50(a) at the close of all 
the evidence, where the purposes of Rule 50 have been met in that both the adverse party 
and the court are aware that the movant continues to believe that the evidence presented 
does not present an issue for the jury. 
MooRE, supra note 24, ~ 50.08. Professor Moore argues that this is the correct rule. He ob-
serves that where a motion clearly notifies a party of the movant's objections to the party's case, 
the cure rationale of the requirement is met and the movant has not created a trap by failing to 
renew the motion at the close of all the evidence. Id. In such a situation, he argues, a denial of 
judgment as a matter of law solely for procedural reasons would be a waste of judicial resources. 
Id. 
Professor Moore goes on to observe, however, that the most common situations in which this 
issue would be presented are those in which "(1) the court indicated that renewal of the motion 
was unnecessary; and/or (2) the evidence following the party's unrenewed motion under Rule 
50(a) was either nonexistent or ... brief enough to be obviously inconsequential •••• " Id. This 
latter statement clearly reflects the two prongs of the plurality test listed in the alternative. In· 
deed, Professor Moore had articulated only the plurality test in prior versions of his treatise, and 
had all but ignored the many variations. See, e.g .. SA JAMES w. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 50.08 (2d ed. 1985). Although this Note agrees with Professor Moore's 
general prejudice standard for the reasons articulated in section III.B, it does not support the 
subsequently listed elements of the two-prong test. 
147. 786 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
148. In the event a party disagrees with a trial court's determination of prejudice, the party 
may appeal the court's ruling on the motion for judgment as a matter of law. Indeed, all of the 
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cases this Note discusses, 149 this determination has been quite straight-
forward. For example, in Bayamon Thom McAn, Inc. v. Miranda, 150 
the court noted that the evidence following the initial motion lasted 
only a few minutes and "held no surprises."151 Similarly, in Ebker v. 
Tan Jay International, Ltd., 152 the court noted that the defendant's 
case, which constituted the sole evidence following the defendant's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, "in no way added to [the 
plaintiff's] case."153 A failure to renew the earlier motion does not 
trap the plaintiff in such cases. 
Where the opposing party is not unfairly prejudiced, rule 1 sup-
ports the conclusion that a court may legitimately excuse the failure to 
renew the motion at the close of all the evidence. In these circum-
stances, it would be both unjust and inefficient to limit the remedy 
under rule 50 to a new trial. The movant in such cases has necessarily 
demonstrated that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; a new 
trial would therefore waste the time, money, and effort of the parties, 
court, and jury on a meritless case.154 Such a waste of judicial re-
sources clearly runs contrary to rule 1. 
Furthermore, many commentators have observed that the formal-
istic requirements of the rule create a procedural trap for litigants. 
Even Paul Carrington, the Reporter of the Advisory Committee on 
the Civil Rules, notes the concern that the rule is "anachronistic, too 
complex, and a trap for the unwary." 155 In suggesting a possible revi-
cases discussed supra notes 62-124 and accompanying text arose in this context. Because the 
appeals court would have a transcript of the trial, that court would also be able to judge whether 
a plaintiff was unfairly prejudiced by the defendant's failure to renew. Furthermore, appellate 
review of this issue should not be particularly time consuming, since excusal would only be 
appropriate where the evidence adduced following the initial motion was minimal or did not bear 
significantly on the issue presented by the motion. 
149. See supra notes 77-124 and accompanying text. 
150. 409 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1969); see supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. Although 
Bayamon does not embrace the prejudice test, the second prong of the Bayamon or plurality test 
requiring evidence adduced following the motion to be brief and inconsequential provides a com-
mon example of nonprejudicial failure to renew. See MOORE, supra note 24, ~ 50.08. 
151. Bayamon, 409 F.2d at 972. 
152. 739 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 161 (1991); see supra notes 97-104 
and accompanying text. 
153. Ebker, 739 F.2d at 824. 
154. A party may move for a new trial without having moved for judgment as a matter of 
law at trial. See FED. R. C1v. P. 59. The standard for granting a new trial is considerably more 
lenient than that for awarding judgment as a matter of law. A motion for judgment as a matter 
of law may be granted only where "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable 
jury to have found for [the opposing party]." FED. R. C1v. P. 50(a). On the other hand, a trial 
court may, in its discretion, order a new trial where "the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence, •.• the damages awarded are excessive or inadequate, .•. newly discovered evidence 
warrants a new trial, or .•. a trial error was committed, such as an improper charge to the jury 
or improper admission or exclusion of evidence." MOORE, supra note 24, ~ 50.03[2]. 
155. See Paul D. Carrington, The Federal Rulemaking Process - The Reporters Speak: 
Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-
Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2110 (1989); see also 
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sion to rule 56 which would eliminate the need for, and the relevant 
requirements of, rule 50, Professor Carrington argues: 
[R]equiring a formal motion for directed verdict has several unfortunate 
consequences. It is a trap: Failing to make a timely motion that a judge 
very likely would have denied could force a party to undergo a new trial. 
The refusal to consider a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict on the sole ground that the party did not make a motion for directed 
verdict is an empty formalism out of keeping with the Rules. 156 
Indeed, the cases this Note discusses confirm this observation. The 
defendants in Bayamon Thom McAn, Inc. v. Miranda, 157 Miller v. 
Rowan Cos., Inc., 15s and Ebker v. Tan Jay International, Ltd. 159 were 
all "trapped" by the requirement. Significantly, the circuits in which 
each of these cases were brought had not at the time adopted any posi-
tion with respect to the interpretation of the "close of all the evidence" 
requirement. The defendants in these cases had no reason to believe 
that the courts would excuse their failure to renew a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law; it is thus unlikely that they failed to comply 
with rule 50(b) for tactical reasons. More probably, these defendants' 
failure to renew their earlier motions was accidental. 160 
Franklin A. Nachman, Posttrial Alchemy: Judgments Notwithstanding the Verdict, Lmo., 
Spring 1989, at 13, 14 ("It is particularly easy to forget renewal of a directed verdict motion at 
the close of evidence ...• Do not fall into that trap."); John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Proce-
dure -Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1883, 1892 (1989) ("I do not know how many 
attorneys lose the right to make a motion for judgment n.o.v. because they have failed to make a 
motion for directed verdict ... [b]ut if this provision of the Rule simply operates as a trap for the 
ignorant or the unwary, it should go."). 
156. Carrington, supra note 155, at 2110. Professor Carrington went on to identify another 
objection to the requirements of rule 50: a party must make a motion for judgment at trial when 
it may be against the party's "tactical interests" to do so. Id. For example, a party may not wish 
to run the risk that a motion for judgment during trial be granted, and thus become subject to 
heightened scrutiny on review, when the jury may simply return a verdict in the movant's favor. 
Id. at 2110-11; see Ebker, 739 F.2d at 824 n.15 ("[W]e recognize that in many cases the failure of 
a defendant's counsel to renew the motion at the close of the case may be not an inadvertence but 
a preference for what is deemed a probable jury verdict in favor of the defendant rather than a 
directed verdict with the inherent risk that such a verdict may be overturned by an appellate 
court."). This problem prompted California to eliminate its requirement that a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict be preceded by a directed verdict motion at trial. See 7 B.E. 
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 436 (3d ed. 1985) ("The use of a motion for directed ver-
dict has steadily declined, for most counsel and trial judges prefer to let the jury initially decide 
the case. The condition of a prior motion for directed verdict was therefore criticized as a useless 
and annoying formality, and in 1963, a State Bar sponsored amendment of C.C.P. 629 eliminated 
it.") (citation omitted). 
The advisory committee's note to the 1991 amendment to rule SO(b) obviates this concern, 
however. The note acknowledges the danger, and adds: 
For these reasons, the court may often wisely decline to rule on a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law made at the close of the evidence, and it is not inappropriate for the moving 
party to suggest such a postponement of the ruling until after the verdict has been rendered. 
FED. R. C1v. P. SO(b) advisory committee's note (1991 amendments). 
157. 409 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1969); see supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. 
158. 815 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
159. 739 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 161 (1991); see supra notes 97-104 
and accompanying text. 
160. See supra note 155. 
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Because most courts have now "weighed in" on the proper inter-
pretation of rule 50(b ), some defendants may not renew earlier mo-
tions for judgment as a matter of law for "tactical" reasons: by not 
renewing at the close of all the evidence, the defendant does not re-
mind the plaintiff of deficiencies in the plaintiff's proof and thus pro-
vide another opportunity for the plaintiff to cure. This situation, 
however, seems quite unlikely. First, even in those circuits that em-
ploy a liberal approach to rule 50(b ), excusal is generally thought to 
apply very rarely; assuming that a court will excuse a failure to renew 
at the close of all the evidence is therefore risky.161 Moreover, 
although this Note argues that the recent amendments to rule 50 do 
not affect the authority of courts to continue with a liberal approach to 
the rule, some circuits may rethink their positions on this issue, and 
therefore a party should not rely strongly on preamendment cases. 
Even if defendants engage in this tactical behavior, however, it does 
not affect the conclusion of this Note, because plaintiffs have already 
been put on notice and given an opportunity to cure by the initial 
motion for judgment as a matter of law.162 
Further, when first drafted, the Federal Rules sought precisely to 
avoid problems like those currently created by a strict reading of rule 
50(b ). At the time, those who contributed to their formulation 
stressed that the purpose of the rules was to facilitate, and not to en-
cumber, substantive rights. 163 In the years that have followed, courts 
and commentators alike have reiterated this primary intent of the Fed-
eral Rules, and have called for the elimination of "the technicalities of 
the law, the subtleties of practice and the involvements of proce-
dure."164 A liberal approach to rule 50(b) supports substantive inter-
ests over procedural technicalities.16s 
161. See, e.g., supra note 85. 
162. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text. Failure to renew merely deprives the 
plaintiff of an additional reminder that his or her case is legally insufficient, which would not 
constitute unfair prejudice under this Note's approach. 
163. See H. Church Ford, More Expeditious Determination of Actions Under the New Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1939). 
164. United Press Assoc. v. Charles, 245 F.2d 21, 26 (9th Cir.) (quoting Glaspell v. Davis, 2 
F.R.D. 301, 304 (D. Or. 1942)), cert denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957). See Jack B. Weinstein, After 
Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1910 (1989) ("An original impetus for the Rules was the belief that by 
reducing unnecessary litigation over procedural points, they would reduce court congestion."); 
Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137"U. 
PA. L. REv. 2197, 2197 (1989) (noting that one of the "central themes and aims" of the rules was 
"[t]o make things simple for the litigants . • . . No longer would technicalities trap the unskilled 
or unwary litigant."); see also Builders Corp. of Am. v. United States, 259 F.2d 766, 771 (9th Cir. 
1958) ("The spirit of the Rules is that technical requirements are abolished and that judgments 
be found on facts and not on formalistic defects."); Des Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th 
Cir. 1955) ("The rules have for their primary purpose the securing of speedy and inexpensive 
justice in a uniform and well ordered manner; they were not adopted to set traps and pitfalls by 
way of technicalities for unwary litigants."). 
165. This approach to rule SO(b) is supported by principles of statutory construction. See 2A 
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In analogous situations courts regularly invoke rule 1 to prevent 
injustices caused by overly strict applications of the Federal Rules. 
For example, in White v. McGinnis, 166 the plaintiff made a timely de-
mand for a jury trial. The trial court nonetheless scheduled and held a 
bench trial, all without the plaintiff's objection. In appealing from the 
court's verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff argued that he had never 
made the written or oral stipulation required by rule 39(a) to waive a 
trial by jury,167 and he therefore deserved a new trial.16s 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, disagreed. Although the court 
acknowledged that the plain meaning of the rule required a written or 
oral stipulation waiving a jury trial, it noted that such an approach to 
the facts before it "would act as an instrument of delay and frustrate 
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."169 The court 
stated that the purpose of the rule was to protect litigants from inad-
vertently waiving their rights to a jury trial through some "careless 
statement or ambiguous document."170 The plaintiff in the case at 
hand, however, had participated in a bench trial without objection; the 
totality of his conduct therefore implied his waiver of a jury trial. 
Rather than force the parties to sacrifice the time and money necessary 
for a new trial, the court rejected a plain meaning approach to the rule 
in favor of the mandate of rule 1.171 Every other circuit considering 
this issue has similarly rejected a formalistic application of rule 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 46.07 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) ("[I]t is 
clear that if the literal import of the text of an act is inconsistent with the legislative meaning or 
intent ... the words of the statute will be modified to agree with the intention of the legisla-
ture.''). Indeed, in his historic article on statutory interpretation, Karl Llewellyn identifies simi-
lar canons of construction: "To effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text." 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 V AND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950). He also notes that plain 
language need not be given effect "when literal interpretation would •.. thwart manifest pur-
pose.'' Id. at 403. Finally, "The letter is only the 'bark.' Whatever is within the reason of the 
law is within the law itself." Id. at 404. Of course, Llewellyn's purpose in listing the canons of 
statutory construction was to explain that for every principle of construction, there exists an 
equal and opposite counterprinciple. Id. at 401; see also supra note 5. But see infra note 203 
(noting Supreme Court's reluctance to adopt lenient approach to statutory interpretation). 
166. 903 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990). White was an Arizona State Prison inmate who filed a 
§ 1983 suit against a Department of Corrections employee, claiming that the employee assaulted 
him while searching his cellblock. 903 F.2d at 700. 
167. Rule 39 states, in relevant part: 
When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated 
upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by 
an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the 
court sitting without a jury .... 
FED. R. C1v. P. 39(a). 
168. 903 F.2d at 700. 
169. 903 F.2d at 701 (citing Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 
1305 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983)). 
170. 903 F.2d at 703. 
171. 903 F.2d at 700-03. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit overruled its earlier decision in 
Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1981) . 
. 
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39(a).172 Federal courts have also refused to apply other rules strictly 
where such an application would achieve an unjust or inefficient 
result. 173 
Furthermore, although it may be argued that reenactment of the 
"close of all the evidence" language in fact indicates the desire of the 
advisory committee and Congress that such language be followed liter-
ally, in fact the opposite is equally plausible. First, the advisory com-
mittee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in amending rule 50(b) 
in 1991, did not make an affirmative effort to reverse the liberal inter-
pretation given the "close of all the evidence" requirement, either in 
the rule itself or in the accompanying advisory committee's note. The 
committee clearly could have done so, because it sought to reverse 
judicial interpretations of other elements of the rule. For example, the 
committee amended (a)(2) to require that a party "specify the judg-
ment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is 
entitled to thejudgment,"174 where section (a) had previously required 
merely that a motion "state the specific grounds therefor."175 In the 
advisory committee's note to the 1991 Amendments, the committee 
states that it made the change to "alter[ ] the result in cases in which 
courts have used various techniques to avoid the requirement that a 
motion for a directed verdict be made as a predicate to a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict."176 
This advisory committee's note does not, however, alter the liberal 
approach to the "close of all the evidence" requirement; it merely reit-
erates that a party must specifically move for judgment as a matter of 
law at trial if it is to make the same motion after the verdict is re-
turned. The advisory committee's note deals with how to make a mo-
tion for judgment as a matter oflaw, rather than when. If the advisory 
committee had wanted to stress that a party must move for judgment 
172. See Royal Arn. Managers., Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1018 (2d Cir. 
1989); Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 227-29 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United States v. 1966 
Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F.2d 947, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1985); Allen v. Barnes 
Hosp., 721 F.2d 643, 644 (8th Cir. 1983); Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 643-45 
(5th Cir. 1976); Wool v. Real Estate Exch., 179 F.2d 62, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (per curiam). 
173. See, e.g., Des Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1955) (finding satisfactory 
"substantial compliance" with requirements of then FED. R. C1v. P. 73(a), which required that 
notice of appeal be filed within thirty days from the entry of the final judgment, when party filed 
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis within the thirty days; court noted that rules "were 
not adopted to set traps and pitfalls by way of technicalities for unwary litigants"); Alexander v. 
Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152, 156 (D.S.C. 1974) (citing rule 1 and refusing to apply a "strict interpreta-
tion" of FED. R. Civ. P. 24(c), which requires that a prospective intervenor file a pleading stating 
the claim for which intervention is sought, when the intervenor stated simply "we would adopt 
the plaintiffs' Complaint as our Complaint in intervention"); see also Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob En-
ters., 932 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1991) (excusing failure to comply with District's Local Rules 
based upon FED. R. C1v. P. 1). 
174. FED. R. C1v. P. 50 (as amended). 
175. FED. R. C1v. P. 50 (prior to 1991 amendments). 
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991 amendments). 
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at the close of all the evidence in order to preserve the right to move 
for judgment as a matter of law after the jury returned its verdict, it 
certainly could have done so. 
Second, rather than stressing the importance of the "close of all the 
evidence" requirement, the advisory committee deemphasized it. The 
advisory committee note observes that the rule requires "that a motion 
for judgment be made prior to the close of the trial subject to renewal 
after a jury verdict has been rendered."177 Although technically only 
·a motion made at the close of all the evidence is subject to renewal 
following the return of the jury's verdict, the advisory committee's 
note downplays the requirement by simply referring to a motion 
"prior to the close of the trial."178 In addition, the advisory commit-
tee's note favorably cites cases which had employed or advocated a 
liberal approach to rule 50(b ), for the proposition that a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law at trial provides the opposing party an 
opportunity to cure.179 Finally, the advisory committee to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, perhaps due to the procedural snares created 
by the current rule, arguably has acquiesced in the various liberal in-
terpretations given the requirements of rule SO(b).180 
B. A Criticism of Other Alternatives 
Besides satisfying the purposes of rule 50(b) and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in general, the approach endorsed in section III.A 
177. FED. R. C!v. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991 amendments) (emphasis added). 
178. FED. R. C!v. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991 amendments). The advisory com-
mittee's note does later provide that the rule "retains the concept of the former rule that the post-
verdict motion is a renewal of an earlier motion made at the close of the evidence." Id. Even 
this, however, is far less stringent than the language of the advisory committee on the 1963 
amendments: "A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict will not lie unless it was 
preceded by a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence." FED. R. CIV. 
P. 50 advisory committee's note (1963 amendments). 
179. The advisory committee's note cites Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
786 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985), discussed supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text, and Benson 
v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir.) (excusing failure of defendant to move for directed verdict at 
the close of all the evidence where opposing party was not unduly prejudiced), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 848 (1986), for the proposition that a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at some 
time prior to the close of the trial provides the nonmovant an opportunity to cure. FED. R. C1v. 
P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991 amendments). 
180. See 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 165, at§ 49.09 ("Where 
reenactment of a statute includes a contemporaneous and practical interpretation, the practical 
interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, as it is regarded as presump-
tively the correct interpretation of the law .... Legislative adoption is presumed conclusive when 
repeated reenactments follow a notorious practical interpretation.") (citations omitted); cf. Loril-
lard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative 
or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute 
without change."). Although these maxims of statutory interpretation applied with more force 
when the interpretation of the statute was unanimous, see Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 
567-68 (1988), reenactment of the "close of all the evidence" requirement without change or a 
supplemental advisory committee note indicates passive acquiescence to the variety of ap-
proaches taken to rule 50(b). 
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is more just than those offered by the other circuits. As noted in sec-
tion II.A, the circuits advocating a strict approach argue that excusing 
the requirements of the rule could allow for "tactical victories at the 
expense of substantive interests."181 When a party receives notice of 
perceived deficiencies, however, the failure to renew does not create a 
trap. Moreover, this argument is a double-edged sword. The party 
that avoids postverdict judgment as a matter of law, simply because of 
lack of a proper procedural predicate, has itself obtained a " 'tactical 
victor[y]'" at the" 'expense of substantive interests.' " 182 Finally, the 
liberal approach to the Federal Rules advocated by rule 1, as discussed 
above, provides the justification for allowing technical noncompliance 
with rule 50(b) when its purposes are otherwise met. The strict ap-
proach to rule 50(b ), while loyal to the language of the rule, betrays its 
spirit. 
The plurality test articulated in Bayamon 183 fails in two regards. 
The first prong, which also appears in the Second Circuit's Ebker 184 
test, requires that the trial court give the moving party some indication 
that the movant bas preserved his right to mount a postverdict chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.185 The language of Bayamon 
suggests that this factor explains why the moving party failed to renew 
its motion, by placing the onus for failing to comply with the dictates 
of rule 50 on the trial judge.186 The same is true of the "reservation" 
requirement found in the Ninth Circuit and the first prong of the Fifth 
Circuit tests. 187 While the actions of the trial judge may in fact ex-
plain a party's failure to renew, such actions should not be a prerequi-
site to a liberal approach to rule 50(b ). As noted in McKinnon, "it 
would be excessively strict to confine the policy of leniency to cases 
where the judge happens to have reserved action on the motion for 
directed verdict when it was made (and never renewed).'' 188 Such an 
approach arbitrarily grants a procedural victory to plaintiffs in cases 
where the trial judge opted to deny, rather than "reserve decision" on, 
an early motion for judgment as a matter oflaw. This in turn leads to 
181. Lowenstein v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 536 F.2d 9, 11 (3d Cir.) (quoting SA JAMES W. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 50.08 (1975)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966 (1976). 
182. Lowenstein, 536 F.2d at 11 (quoting MOORE ET AL., supra note 181). 
183. Bayamon Thom McAn, Inc. v. Miranda, 409 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1969). 
184. Ebker v. Tan Jay Intl., Ltd., 739 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 161 
(1991). 
185. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. 
186. See, e.g., Bayamon, 409 F.2d at 971 ("In a sense the court may well have led counsel 
reasonably to believe that all had been done that was necessary."); Gillentine v. McKeand, 426 
F.2d 717, 722 (1st Cir. 1970) (in considering the Bayamon decision, noting that "we felt that the 
defendants there could be relieved of the consequences of the trial court's misleading statements 
without doing violence to the policy of [rule 50]."). 
187. See supra notes 105-09 and 88-96, respectively, and accompanying text. 
188. McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1390 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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different results in cases with identical claims, depending upon 
whether the judge reserves or denies the initial motion. 
The second prong of the plurality test is also problematic. This 
prong states that lenience is appropriate where the evidence intro-
duced following the motion is brief and inconsequential.189 Either or 
both of the parties could introduce a substantial amount of evidence 
following an unsuccessful motion for judgment as a matter of law.190 
Where none of the subsequently introduced evidence relates to the is-
sue raised in the motion or where it merely strengthens the movant's 
case, the fact that the amount of evidence was substantial should have 
no effect on deciding whether to excuse the movant's failure to renew 
the motion. As noted by the court in Ebker, in rejecting Bayamon's 
second prong: "[I]f on analysis the additional evidence, even though 
extensive, accomplishes what the defendant intended it should, i.e., 
strengthening his case without simultaneously exposing a flaw, little 
justification would seem to exist for finding significance in the quanti-
tative aspect .... " 191 
The Ninth Circuit's test is also troublesome. It excuses failure to 
renew an initial motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence 
whenever the judge has res~rved her decision on the motion, even if 
the plaintiff submits additional relevant information following the mo-
tion.192 A plaintiff may believe at the close of all the evidence that she 
filled the gaps in her case through the additional evidence. The de-
fendant, if he continues to believe that the plaintifrs case is insufficient, 
should then move again for judgment as a matter of law to indicate 
this belief. Under the Ninth Circuit approach, the judge's reservation 
of the initial motion is presumed to indicate a continuing challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence. When the plaintiff may reasonably be-
lieve that she has met the challenge, the defendant should be obligated 
to renew the challenge through a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law at the close of all the evidence. Under the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach, however, this is not required, and such a plaintiff is therefore 
unfairly prejudiced. 
Finally, although litigants whose attorneys fail to follow the rule's 
strict requirements may find redress in a legal malpractice action, forc-
ing them to such a remedy is clearly not consistent with the goal of 
rule 1.193 Malpractice actions are particularly onerous because the liti-
189. For a discussion of this element, see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra text accompanying note 102. 
· 191. Ebker v. Tan Jay Intl., Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 824 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Moran v. Ray-
mond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 415 U.S. 932 (1974)), cert. denied, 
112 s. Ct. 161 (1991). 
192. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
March 1993] Note - Rule 50{b) 1095 
gant must generally prove a "case within a case."194 That is, a defend-
ant who is precluded from seeking a postverdict judgment as a matter 
of law because defense counsel failed to comply with rule 50(b) must 
prove both that the lawyer's omission created a viable cause of action 
and also that this omission damaged the defendant. In order to prove 
the latter point, the defendant must prove that the court would have, 
or should have, granted the postverdict motion.195 Although there 
may be clear indications of the court's intent in some cases, 196 often-
times there are not.197 Because of this difficulty, legal malpractice can-
not fully remedy dismissal after procedural error.198 
For these reasons, some courts and commentators have specifically 
rejected the notion of malpractice suits in favor of more efficient and 
just altematives.199 For example, in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co., 200 the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice after 
plaintiff's counsel failed to meet certain discovery deadlines and proce-
dural requisites, and suggested that the plaintiffs pursue a malpractice 
suit against their lawyer.201 In considering the statement, the Third 
Circuit noted that malpractice suits hinder "the goal of a court system, 
that of delivering evenhanded justice to litigants, ... since [such suits] 
194. Paul D. Rheingold, Legal Malpractice: Plaintiffs Strategies, 15 LmG., Winter 1989, at· 
13, 13. 
195. See id. 
196. See, e.g., DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978). 
197. See, e.g., Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983) (no indication of 
whether judgment as a matter oflaw would have been granted if proper procedural predicate had 
been met). 
198. Cf. Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1308 (1963) (noting that a 
malpractice plaintiff must prove that the dismissed suit would have succeeded). For example, in 
ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIAB., CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER 40 (1989), 
the Center reported that only 6.16% of all legal malpractice cases that went through a complete 
trial resulted in a judgment and payment for the plaintiff. In contrast, however, plaintiffs gener-
ally win judgment in approximately 50% of all trials. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 31-34 (1984) (data from.Cook 
County, Ill. showing that 48.47% of all jury trials resulted in verdicts for plaintiffs, and 51.53% 
resulted in verdicts for defendants); see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: 
A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 
333-35 (1991) (agreeing generally with Priest and Klein that approximately 50% of all trials 
result in plaintiff judgments, but noting that plaintiff success varies significantly depending upon 
the type of claim). 
199. See, e.g., Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1987): 
[P]ublic confidence in the legal system is undermined when a litigant's claim is dismissed 
due to the blameworthy actions of their counsel .•.. The litigant does have recourse in such 
a case - a malpractice action - but that approach may not result in a hearing on the 
merits of the plaintiffs case. 
813 F.2d at 1304 (citation omitted); Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 
(3d Cir. 1984); see also Note, Involuntary Dismissal for Disobedience or Delay: The Plaintiffs 
Plight, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 922, 929-34 (1967). 
200. 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). 
201. Pou/is, 747 F.2d at 867. 
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would only multiply rather than dispose of litigation."202 The same 
logic applies to the issue here, particularly because the liberal ap-
proach to rule SO(b) does not unfairly prejudice either party. 
C. A Proposed Revision to Rule 50(b) 
This Note has argued for a liberal interpretation of the current rule 
SO(b ). However, given conflicting doctrines of statutory interpreta-
tion, 203 the rule should be amended to reflect its true purpose better. 
One possible amendment to the current rule, which would be added 
following the first sentence, is as follows: 
Whenever a motion for judgment as a matter of law made prior to the 
close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, and 
where the opposing party is not unfairly prejudiced by the movant's fail-
ure to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence, the court is 
deemed to have submitted the action to a jury subject to a later determi-
nation of the legal questions raised by the motion. 
This approach both incorporates the current liberal interpretation of 
the rule and allows those courts that have previously felt constrained 
by the language of the current version to grant judgment as a matter of 
law in appropriate cases. 204 
202. 747 F.2d at 867. The court ultimately concluded that, although it would likely not have 
dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 747 
F.2d at 870. 
203. See, e.g., Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892 (1982). The merits, or lack thereof, of a "plain 
meaning" approach to statutory interpretation are beyond the scope of this Note, except to the 
extent that the approach is rejected in favor of a "purpose" approach to rule 50(b) for the reasons 
stated in section III.A. For further discussion of competing norms of statutory interpretation, 
see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE. RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OP 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theo-
dore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia Univer· 
sity Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 V AND. L. REV. 687 
(1992); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to 
Aleinikojf and Shaw, 45 V AND. L. REv. 715 (1992); Daniel J. Capra, Discretion Must Be Con· 
trolled, Judicial Authority Circumscribed, Federalism Preserved, Plain Meaning Enforced, and 
Everything Must Be Simplified: Recent Supreme Court Contributions to Federal Civil Practice, 50 
Mo. L. REv. 632 (1991); William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and 
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pm. L. REv. 691 (1987); Llewellyn, supra note 
165, at 401-04. See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 165. This Note also proposes an amend-
ment to rule 50(b) in light of the Supreme Court's tendency, despite its recognition of FED. R. 
Civ. P. 1, to read the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strictly. See, e.g., Johnson v. New York, 
N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 49-51 (1952) (holding that a party who had moved to have a verdict 
set aside because it was contrary to the law could not be granted judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict because "it did riot as [rule 50] requires move ••. 'to have judgment entered in accord-
ance with [its] motion for a directed verdict'"). 
204. This amendment would meet Redman's standard and create a fictional reservation of 
the initial motion, identical to that contained in the first sentence of the current rule 50(b). As n 
result, postverdict consideration of a motion for judgment as a matter of law would be a consid· 
eration of an earlier, reserved motion, and thus would not violate the Seventh Amendment under 
the Court's reasoning. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conflict between the language of rule 50 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and its underlying purpose has created a division 
within the courts as to the proper application of the rule. While two 
circuits have strictly interpreted the rule, a majority of the circuits 
have looked beyond the text of the rule to its purposes and have, under 
various tests, attempted to apply the rule according to those purposes. 
The latter approach better fulfills the liberal spirit of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the mandate of rule 1, which directs 
courts to apply the rules in a just and efficient manner.205 When a 
party makes a motion for judgment as a matter of law with sufficient 
specificity at some point in the trial, and the opposing party is not 
unfairly prejudiced by a failure to renew the motion, courts should not 
strictly enforce the requirement that the motion be renewed at the 
close of all the evidence. This approach embodies the rules' ultimate 
goals: the triumph of substantive interests over tactical victories and 
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."206 
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. 
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. 
